Nationhood and Muslims in Britain by Meer, Nasar et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Meer, Nasar and Uberoi, Varun and Modood, Tariq (2015) Nationhood and 
Muslims in Britain. In: Fear, Anxiety, and National Identity. Russell Sage. 
ISBN 978-1-61044-853-6 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/54937/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Nationhood and Muslims in Britain  
 
 
Nasar Meer*, Varun Uberoi**, and Tariq Modood*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Reader in Comparative Social Policy and Citizenship, Royal Society of Edinburgh 
Research Fellow (2014-2019), Strathclyde University, Lord Hope Building, 141 St 
George Road, Glasgow, G1 0LT, UK (nasar.meer@strath.ac.uk) 
 
**Senior Lecturer in Politics, Brunel University Marie Jahoda, Room 231, Uxbridge, 
UB8 3PH, UK (varun.uberoi@brunel.ac.uk) 
  
***Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy, Director of the Centre for the 
Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, Bristol University, 3 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TX, 
UK (T.Modood@bristol.ac.uk) 
 2 
 
 
Introduction 
µ7KHVHDUHGLIILFXOWWLPHVWREH%ULWLVK¶maintain Gamble and Wright (2009: 1). 
Their assessment centres RQ KRZ µWKH VWDWH ZKLFK XQGHUSLQQHG %ULWLVK LGHQWLW\ LV QR
ORQJHUWKHFRQILGHQWVWUXFWXUHRIHDUOLHUWLPHV¶LELG They are not alone in coming to 
this view1, and at least two implications follow from their observation. One is that the 
political unity of the administrative and bureaucratic components of the state is related to 
cultural features of British nationhood, including the ways in which people express 
feeling and being British.  This is perhaps a familiar assessment of the configuration of all 
nation-states, though it could also imply that the state has been one ± though not 
necessarily the most important - touchstone in the historical cultivation of µBritish¶ as a 
national identity (Uberoi and McLean, 2009).   
 
A number of contemporary political developments which put into question the 
prevailing coherence of the British state (e.g., devolution, European integration, 
globalisation) might add to the kinds of issues informing Gamble and Wright¶V view, and 
                                                 
1 6FKRODUVW\SLFDOO\EHJLQDFKURQRORJ\RIWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\µ%ULWLVKTXHVWLRQ¶E\PDNLQJUHIHUHQFHWR7RP
1DLUQ¶VThe Break-Up of Britain.  Nairn of course was a Marxist critic who offered more of a 
challenge to the idea of the union than an analysis of its condition.  For our purposes the debate really 
FRPPHQFHVLQWKHHDUO\VDQGLVQHDWO\VXPPDULVHGE\WKHODWH%HUQDUG&ULFN¶V
REVHUYDWLRQIURPWKHPLGGOHRIWKDWGHFDGHRIKRZµ«IRUWKHILUVWWLPHDQ\RQHFDQUHPHPEHULQDSHRSOH
who have taken themselves so much for granted, have been widely envied for their psychological security, 
an anxious debate has broken out about nationDOLGHQWLW\¶The difference between Great Britain and the 
United Kingdom can be confusing.  Politically, Great Britain EULQJVWRJHWKHUWKHWKUHHµKRPHQDWLRQV¶RI
England, Scotland and Wales, as well as a number of islands off the coasts of England, Scotland and Wales 
(e.g., the Isle of Wight, Anglesey, the Isles of Scilly, the Hebrides, and the island groups of Orkney and 
Shetland).  The United Kingdom, meanwhile, includes all of these as well as Northern Ireland.  Territories 
that have further autonomy from both Great Britain and the United Kingdom include the Isle of Man and 
the Channel Islands which have distinct legislative and taxation systems. The derivation of the term Great 
Britain predates the British Empire, and is a consequence of distinguishing the British mainland from 
µ/HVVHU%ULWDLQ¶ZKLFKDSSUR[LPDWHVWRPRGHUQ%ULWWDQ\LQ)UDQFH 
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are perhaps most starkly illustrated by the promised 2014 referendum on Scottish 
Independence.  Of course Britain has since its very inception been a multinational state.2  
µ%ULWDLQ¶ZDVFRQVWUXFted in a series of treaties and Parliamentary Acts between its 
constituent nations: England and Wales joining in 1536, with the addition of Scotland in 
1603 and 1707, Ireland in 1801 (formalizing a long-standing occupation), and Northern 
Island in 1921-2 and 1949. Britain thus has always contained a certain intrinsic tension, 
which has had the potential to be productive as well as undermining3.  It should therefore 
FRPHDVQRVXUSULVHWROHDUQWKDWµWKHHPSLULFDOYLHZRI%ULWLVKQHVVLVRSHQWRREMHFWLRQ¶
(Parekh, 2009: 33), for %ULWDLQ¶V µQHVWHG¶QDWLRQVKDYHDOZD\VUHWDLQHGDQGFXOWLYDWHG± 
rather than erased - distinguishing languages, churches, systems of law, jurisdiction over 
education and local governance, alongside other features of civil-society. To some extent 
it is precisely these issues which are now reflected in forms of regional citizenship 
(Hepburn, 2010), and re-DUWLFXODWHGLQFXUUHQWGHEDWHVRQWKHVHQDWLRQV¶WHUULWRULDO
governance in a manner that goes beyond issues of constitutional devolution per se (Jones 
& Fowler, 2007, cf Bogdanor, 1979).    Questions of national identity in Britain (e.g., 
who is µ%ULWLVK¶DQGZKDWGRHVµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ consist of?) are therefore complicated by the 
fact that (QJOLVKDQG%ULWLVKKDYHORQJEHHQµFRQIXVHG± [with] the coterminosity of 
flag, anthem, symbols compounding the confusion¶ (McCrone, 2002: 304).  While - as 
yet - µ(QJOLVKQDWLRQDOLVPLVWKHGRJWKDWGLGQRWEDUN¶.XPDUWKHVDPHLV
                                                 
2 Although a multi-QDWLRQDOµ%ULWLVK¶VWDWHDQGLQGHHGLGHQWLW\DOEHLWXQHYHQO\FDPHDERXWWKURXJKWLPH
a formal category of British citizenship (as distinct from the imperial category civis Britannicus sum) did 
not emerge until the mid-twentieth century period of post-war decolonisation. This multinational 
settlement, however, has always been a-symmetrical to the extent it has not been evenly federal (but instead 
unevenly devolved). 
3 Moreover, other times have seen severe tensions threatening a unified Britain, for example, the period of 
winding down of empire in the post-war period, in which a series of wide-ranging questions on the future 
of the Union were raised (Augley, 2009).  
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not true for (QJODQG¶VScottish, Welsh and Northern Irish neighbours. In each of the three 
cases nationalist and regionalist parties have recently assumed power at the regional 
level, either outright or in a minority or coalition government (Hepburn and McLoughlin, 
2011).   
 
The second implication in Gamble and WULJKW¶V statement about the decline of 
British identity, is at first less obvious but no less important. It concerns how current 
debates about Britishness are not restricted to national minorities, but have also come to 
focus on ethnic minorities, namely migrant and post-immigrant minorities, frequently 
thoXJKWRIDVµYLVLEOH¶PLQRULWLHVFor example, one salient articulation of contemporary 
British national identity in governmental policy and discourse, frequently discussed in the 
press, is concerned with the promotion of common civic values, as well as English 
language competencies among ethnic minorities through a wider knowledge of - and self-
identification with ± British cultural, historical and institutional heritages, as well as 
approved kinds of political engagement and activity (Meer and Modood, 2009).  A sort of 
British civic national identity, as the Commission on the future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 
(CMEB) (2000) described, remains embedded in particular cultural values and traditions 
that involve not only an allegiance to the state, but also intuitive, emotional, symbolic 
allegiances to a historic nation, even while the idea of the nation is contested and re-
imagined.    
 
7ZRµPLQRULWLHV¶RURQHµPDMRULW\¶ 
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Although this chapter is principally concerned with the place of Muslims in British 
nationhood, some elaboration of the on-going debates concerning British nationhood is 
required to properly understand the place of Muslims within these debates. To be sure, 
Muslims have not created the wider debate (Meer, 2010). On the contrary, they have 
found themselves positioned between two impulses. One is a centrifugal multinationalism 
(e.g., Welsh devolution, Northern Ireland power sharing, the prospect of Scottish 
Independence), and the other is centripetal (e.g., the civic integration of newer ethnic 
minorities).  These need not pull in opposite directions, in so far as µ%ULWDLQ¶VSDVW DQG
present immigrant minorities easily fit into this [FRPPRQ@IUDPHZRUN¶ (Parekh 2009: 37).  
By common framework we might think about a consensus that multiple identities are 
valuable and not in themselves a problem for identifying with Britain As Parekh argues, 
µ>M@XVW DV LW [Britain] has learned to respect the diversity of its four nations, it should 
respect the diversity of LWVLPPLJUDQWV¶There are important conditions for this prospect 
which can hinder or facilitate a meaningful settlement where minorities feel that they 
belong and their status as British is not constantly challenged or questioned. Parekh 
continues:  
The way a country treats its members plays a particularly important role.  They 
are more likely to identify with the country if they are accepted as its full and 
legitimate members and treated with respect, enjoy equality with the rest, are 
free to express their other cherished identities, and have the opportunity to lead 
a minimally decent life. Conversely, they are unlikely to feel at home in the 
country and see it as theirs if their very presence is resented, if they are 
subjected to discriminatory treatment, mocked and ridiculed with impunity, or if 
they are required to sacrifice their other identities as a precondition of their 
membership or as proof of their commitment to the country (ibid. 34).  
 
Applying this observation to the question of where Muslims fit into contemporary 
debates about nationhood in Britain brings out that national identities usually reflect the 
 6 
culture of the majority (Smith, 1988; Uberoi, 2007). One normative option is to re-make 
the nation (and national identities) in plural forms, something which needs to register 
ZKDW %LOOLJ  KDV GHVFULEHG DV WKH µEDQDO¶ IHDWXUHV of ordinary nationhood which 
may not commonly be understood to be inscribed with majority ethnic, cultural or racial 
features.  It  was this very assessment of British national identity which, at the turn of the 
twenty-first century informed the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic BULWDLQ¶V
(CMEB), a non-governmental inquiry created by an influential equality charity (the 
Runneymede Trust). This inquiry characterized British national identity as potentially 
µEDVHGRQJHQHUDOLVDWLRQV>WKDW@LQYROYHDVHOHFWLYHDQGVLPSOLILHGDFFRXQWRIDFRPSOH[
KLVWRU\¶ LQZKLFK µ>P@DQ\FRPSOLFDWHGVWUDQGV DUH UHGXFHG WRD VLPSOH WDOHRI HVVHQWLDO
DQG HQGXULQJ QDWLRQDO XQLW\¶ FPPG  S ¶  Because they do not easily fit into a 
majoritarian account of national identity, or  cannot  be reduced to or assimilated into a 
prescribed public culture,  PLQRULW\µGLIIHUHQFHV¶thus may be  negatively conceived.   
Britain has faced particular challenges in addressing issues of disadvantage tied to 
cultural difference experienced by a variety of ethnic and religious minorities.  The most 
substantive response, developed cumulatively during the final quarter of the last century 
and comprised of a range of policies and discourses, is commonly known as 
multiculturalism. The multicultural response has sought to promote equality of access to 
opportunities and accommodate aspects of minority difference while promoting the social 
and moral benefits of ethnic minority-related diversity in an inclusive sense of civic 
belonging.  This has neither been a linear nor stable development and has frequently been 
subject to (often productive) criticism from a variety of camps, and has especially been 
under stress since the publication of the CMEB report (Meer and Modood, 2014).  Over a 
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decade since the publication of this report, a period that has included civil disturbances, 
wars abroad and then terrorism at home, as well as the distinctively multicultural London 
2012 Olympics, the core idea that Britain rejects the idea of integration ---  being based 
XSRQDGULYHIRUXQLW\WKURXJKXQFRPSURPLVLQJFXOWXUDOµDVVLPLODWLRQ¶-- remains as true 
as ever.  
This is not to say that competing discourses and policies do not have significant 
traction, but WKHUHVLOLHQFHDQGG\QDPLVPRI5R\-HQNLQV¶IDPRXVGHILQLWLRQof 
integration in Britain - DVµQRWDIODWWHQLQJSURFHVVRIDVVLPLODWLRQEXWHTXDORSSRUWXQLW\
accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of PXWXDOWROHUDQFH¶ ± is clearly 
evident to those who choose to look. That is not to deny this has been qualified.  Hence 
the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) explicitly introduced a test 
(implemented in 2005) for those seeking British citizenship.  Thus applicants should 
VKRZµDVXIILFLHQWNQRZOHGJHRI(QJOLVK:HOVKRU6FRWWLVK*DHOLF¶DQGµDVXIILFLHQW
NQRZOHGJHDERXWOLIHLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶ (Home Office 2004, p. 11). Those 
LPPLJUDQWVVHHNLQJWRVHWWOHLQWKH8.DSSO\LQJIRUµLQGHILQLWHOHDYHWRUHPDLQ¶HTXDOO\
have to pass the test (effective since April 2007). If applicants do not have sufficient 
knowledge of English, they are encouraged to attend English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes. Despite important variations therefore it is 
evidently the case that in North Western Europe there is presently a renewed emphasis 
and explicitness on national identities amongst countries that have not always prioritised 
this e.g. Britain, Denmark, and increasingly Germany. This phenomenon is not simply a 
PHWKRGRORJLFDODUWHIDFWZKRVHWUXHPHDQLQJLVREVFXUHGE\µPHWKRGRORJLFDO
QDWLRQDOLVP¶ 
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For in contrast to other to such cases, post migrant groups have been recognised 
as ethnic and racial minorities requiring state support and differential treatment to 
overcome distinctive barriers in their exercise of citizenship. It includes how, under the 
remit of several Race Relations Acts (RRAs), the state has sought to integrate minorities 
into the labour market and other key arenas of British society through a cumulative 
approach that promotes equal access as an example of equality of opportunity. It is nearly 
40 years since the introduction of a third RRA (1976) cemented a state sponsorship of 
race equality by consolidating earlier, weaker legislative instruments (RRA 1965, 1968). 
Alongside its broad remit spanning public and private institutions, recognition of indirect 
discrimination DQGWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIDVWDWXWRU\SXEOLFGXW\WRSURPRWHJRRGµUDFH
UHODWLRQV¶LW created the Commission for Racial Equality (later amalgamated into the 
Equality & Human Rights Commission) to assist individual complainants and monitor 
the implementation of the Act. Does this amount to multiculturalism?  We have argued 
that it amounts to a British multiculturalism which, although lacking an official 
µ0XOWLFXOWXUDO$FW¶RUµ&KDUWHU¶LQWKHZD\RI$XVWUDOLDRU Canada, rejected the idea of 
integration being based upon a drive for unity through an uncompromising cultural 
µDVVLPLODWLRQ¶RYHU\HDUVDJR 
 
µ)UDPLQJ¶ Muslims 
  According to the most recent census of England and Wales (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012: 2), around 2.7 million people (4.8 per cent of the population) define 
themselves as µMuslim¶.  This makes Muslims the second largest religious group after 
Christians (33.2 million people amounting to 59.3 per cent of the population). As the 
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Office for National Statistics (2012: 8) summarises, the areas with the highest proportion 
of Muslims are in London (especially Tower Hamlets and Newham which are, 
respectively, 34.5 per cent and 32.0 per cent Muslim, and Redbridge and Waltham Forest, 
where the figure is over 20 per cent). Beyond London, areas with more than 20 per cent 
Muslims include Blackburn with Darwen in the North West (27.0 per cent), as well as 
Bradford in Yorkshire and the Humber, Luton in the East of England, Slough in the 
South East, and Birmingham in the West Midlands.  The precise cross-tabulations of 
ethnic composition are yet to be released, but it is anticipated that they will not show a 
radical departure from the configuration of ethnic proportions set out in the last census 
(ONS, 2001).  In 2001, those of Pakistani origin made up 42.5 per cent of the Muslim 
population, Bangladeshis 16.8 per cent, Indians 8.5 per cent , and most interestingly other 
white, 7.5 per cent . This other white category includes people of Turkish, Arabic and 
North African ethnic origin who did not define themselves in non-white terms as well as 
East European Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo and white Muslims from across 
Europe.  Finally, 6.2 percent of the Muslim population identified as Black African, 5.8 
percent as Other Asian, and 4.1 percent as British. Even with this heterogeneity, it is still 
understandable that Muslims in Britain are associated first and foremost with a South 
Asian background, especially since they make up roughly 68 per cent of the British 
Muslim population. 
Though a small proportion of the total population of England and Wales, Muslims 
are the minority group over whom there has been most concern with respect to national 
loyalty and integration (Gallup, 2009, 20).  This may partly be due to anxieties following 
the attacks of 9/11 (in New York) and 7/7 (in London), although fear throughout the West 
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of Muslims and questions about theLUOR\DOW\SUHGDWHWKHµZDURQWHUURU¶0DWDU
Muslim identities have thus become a staple feature of contemporary political discussion 
in Britain. It is the content of these familiar discussions, however, which some have 
DUJXHGµRSHUDWHVDVWKHRWKer half of a distorted dialogue,¶WKDWLVRIFRQFHUQ0RUHO\DQG
Hussain, 2011: 5).  Despite fears of %ULWLVK0XVOLPV¶OR\DOW\available evidence suggests 
that most Muslims do identify with Britain and feel British. Using the 2005 Citizenship 
survey, Heath and Roberts (2008, 14) show that 43 percent of Muslim respondents claim 
WKDWWKH\µYHU\VWURQJO\¶EHORQJWR%ULWDLQDQG percent VD\WKDWWKH\EHORQJµIDLUO\
VWURQJO\¶7KHVHILJXUHVDUHFRUURERUDWHGE\HDUOLHUsurvey data, and later surveys even 
suggest that British Muslims identify more strongly with Britain than the British public at 
large (Modood et al, 1997; Gallup, 2009).  Polling data from Wind-Cowie and Gregory 
(2011) support this further: 
 
Our polling shows that 88 per cent of Anglicans and Jews agreed that they 
ZHUHµSURXGWREHD%ULWLVKFLWL]HQ¶DORQJVLGHSHUFHQWRIQRQ-conformists 
and 83 per cent of Muslims ± compared with 79 per cent for the population 
as a whole.  (p. 39) [...] This optimism in British Muslims is significant as ± 
combined with their high score for pride in British ± it runs counter to a 
prevailing narrative about Muslim dissatisfaction with and in the UK. While 
it is true that there are significant challenges to integration for some in the 
British Muslim community ± and justified concern at the levels of 
radicalism and extremism in some British Muslim communities ± overall 
British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about 
Britain than are the white British community. (p. 41). 
 
Despite this evidence, leading politicians often conceive of and portray Muslims as 
having difficulty µfeeling %ULWLVK¶DQGthat their British identities are meaningful parts of 
their individual identities. Likewise, many leading journalists portray some Muslims as 
having difILFXOW\µEHLQJ%ULWLVK¶DQGEHKDYLQJDV%ULWLVKSHRSOHDUHµVXSSRVHG¶WR behave.  
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These portrayals have significant consequences. Politicians who control the state, through 
institutions like the publicly funded education system, media and arts, help to shape the 
EURDGHUSXEOLF¶Vsubjective sense of national identity issues (Gellner, 1983, 57; Smith, 
1992, 100). Similarly,  journalists who write for  national newspapers  convey 
information about, as well as an image of, the nation that readers often internalise, thus  
influencing  the way they think abRXWWKHLURZQDQGWKHH[WHQWRIRWKHUV¶LGHQWLILFDWion 
with the nation   (Anderson, 1983).  If senior politicians and journalists suggest that some 
Muslims have difficulty feeling and being British, it is unsurprising if Muslims are seen 
as outsiders by large sections of the public in Britain. The discourse about Muslims by 
important public figures, in short, contributes to and reinforces a sense among many in 
Britain that Muslims, or at least a good many Muslims, do not belong.  
 
Feeling British4 
How do senior Labour and Conservative party politicians conceptualise and 
portray the ability of Muslims to feel British? We can begin to get a glimpse of their 
views through interviews we conducted in 2007-8 with six members of the then Labour 
government (Labour was in power between 1997 and 2010) and four members of the 
shadow Conservative cabinet as well as published reports of their speeches and 
comments. All the politicians interviewed  had some ministerial or shadow cabinet 
responsibility for  the policy area of community cohesion, which since its introduction in 
2001 as a focus by the government has been intimately tied to issues relating to Muslims 
                                                 
4 These sections draw on previously published materials from Meer, Dwyer, and Modood (2010); Uberoi 
and Modood (2010) and Uberoi, Meer, Modood, and Dwyer (2011). 
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and Britishness  (Dwyer and Uberoi, 2009; McGhee, 2003, 377; Bright, 2007, 11).5 
Indeed, this policy area was initially created to help prevent disturbances like those that 
occurred in 2001 in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in which young Muslims participated, 
often provoked by the far-right British National Party; the policy area also developed in 
response to reports on the disturbances that recommended a national GHEDWH RQ µWKH
FRPPRQ HOHPHQWV RI QDWLRQKRRG¶ +RPH 2IILFH   7Ke reports seemed to 
suggest that Muslims who participated in the riots had difficulty seeing themselves as  
British, a view supported by the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, who praised the 
UHSRUWV IRU IDFLQJ µKHDG RQ¶KRZ µSHRSOH LQ WKH $VLDQFRPPXQLW\ KHOS WKH VHFRQGDQG
WKLUGJHQHUDWLRQIHHO%ULWLVK«¶,QGHSHQGHQW  
Certain junior ministers, like Angela Eagle MP, responsible for community 
cohesion policies were sanguine about the ability of Muslims to feel British. Hence 
Eagle, when interviewed , said that µKDYLQJD%ULWLVKLGHQWLW\LVQ¶WLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKEHLQJ
a British PakiVWDQL¶ (Interview with Angela Eagle 15.10.07) 0LNH 2¶%ULHQ 03, a 
Minister of State for Pension Reform in 2007-08, but a previous minister for Race 
Equality 1999-2001,  said that µDORWRI0XVOLPVDFWXDOO\GR¶IHHOµ%ULWLVK¶DQGWKDWWKH\
are unlikely to haYHGLIILFXOW\GRLQJVREHFDXVHµDSHUVRQFDQIHHOGXDOLGHQWLW\\RXFDQ
EH %ULWLVK DQG \RX FDQ IHHO 3DNLVWDQL«WKDW¶V QRW D SUREOHP¶ (Interview with Mike 
2¶%ULHQ.  Fiona Mactaggart MP suggested that even Muslims who say they do 
not feel British may not really be rejecting their British identities:  µ,I WKH %ULWLVK
government has done something you think is wrong, like going to war with Iraq, then you 
                                                 
5 Varun Uberoi conducted nine of these interviews and Tariq Modood one of them. Each interview was 
semi-structured, lasted approximately an hour and, as the main text indicates, was with a Labour or 
Conservative politician who since 2001 had responsibility in government or opposition for community 
cohesion. 
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FDQVD\,¶PQRORQJHU%ULWLVK«WKDW¶VDZD\RIUHMHFWLQJWKHLUYDOXHV«%XW,¶PQRWVXUH
how profounG LW LV¶ (Interview with Fiona Mactaggart 16.10.07). These Labour Party 
Ministers contested the view that Muslims had difficulty feeling British, but this was not 
so for their senior colleague and cabinet minister David Blunkett.  To be sure, Blunkett 
claiPHG µ\RX FDQ EH ILUVW JHQHUDWLRQ 3DNLVWDQL DQG %ULWLVK«¶ ,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK 'DYLG
Blunkett, 11.03.08). But when asked which immigrant groups might have difficulty 
feeling British he indicated that among some Pakistanis µ, WKLQN WKHUH
VD OLSVHUYLFH WR
Britishness and the issue is if we get under the surface, do people really mean it, do they 
IHHOLW"¶+HDGGed: 
µ\RXVHH3DNLVWDQLFRYHUVDORWRIGLIIHUHQWEDFNJURXQGV3DVKWXQDQGDOOWKHUHVW
of it, and so it's difficult and they don't always agree with each other.  So I 
DOZD\V KDYH WR ILQG RXW ZKR WKH FRPPXQLW\ OHDGHUV DUH ODXJKV«« , WKLQN
they would, I think all those groups would pay DOLSVHUYLFHWREHLQJ%ULWLVK« 
(ibid). 
Unsure about whether many Pakistanis pay lip service to Britishness, Blunkett 
stated that µ,GRQ
WKDYHDQ\DXWKHQWLFVWDWLVWLFVRQLW,GRQ
WKDYHDQ\WKLQJWKDWLVQRWMXVW
SXUHDQHFGRWH«¶LELG,QGHHG%OXQNHWWZDVWKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\ZKRVHWXSWKH+RPH
Office Citizenship Survey which, as already noted, showed that more than four-fifths of 
Muslim respondents claimed WKDW WKH\ µYHU\ VWURQJO\¶ RU ³IDLrO\ VWURQJO\´  belong to 
Britain  (Heath and Roberts, 2008, p.14) In establishing this survey, Blunkett reflected 
WKH WXUQ WRZDUGV µHYLGHQFH EDVHG SROLF\¶ DQG WKH SUHYDLOLQJ µPRRG¶ LQ government  in 
support RIµPDQDJHPHQWE\QXPEHUV¶+RRG-8). It is thus difficult to understand 
why despite requesting data relating to Muslims and despite a mood in government that 
favoured using it, Blunkett relied on anecdotal information. One possible reason that  
%OXQNHWWIHOWWKDWKHGLGQ¶WKDYHDQ\µauthentic VWDWLVWLFV¶RQZKHWKHU0XVOLPVIHHO%ULWLVK
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is his view that survey data on Muslims attitudes to feeling British reflect the µlip service¶ 
that he thinks some of them are willing to pay to Britishness. 
 
Blunkett also linked views about feeling British to social class.  Some Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi Muslims, he indicated, have difficulty feeling British because they DUH µDW
WKH YHU\ ERWWRP RI WKH HFRQRPLF ODGGHU¶ DQG KH EHOLHYHV WKDW WKHUe is a relationship 
between feeling British, integration, and being economically successful:   
The Hindu community have managed not to be the focal point of bitterness 
DQGKDWUHG«EHFDXVHWKHUH
VDYHU\PXFKODUJHUPLGGOHFODVVDQGZKHUHYHU
you have a laUJHUPLGGOHFODVV«WKHQLQWHJUDWLRQVRFLDOFRKHVLRQJRKDQGLQ
KDQG«$QGWKHUHIRUHWKHDQVZHUWR\RXUTXHVWLRQLV WKRVHDUHDVRI LQZDUG
migration, where people have been struggling at the very bottom end of the 
economic ladder, that obviously means Bangladeshi and to some extent 
3DNLVWDQLFRPPXQLWLHVDOWKRXJKWKDWLVFKDQJLQJ«LELG 
 
In a lecture he delivered in 2003, Blunkett spoke of a growing number of young Muslims 
who believe they have to choose between identifying as Muslim or British, and similar 
claims have been made by other leading government politicians.  As Blunkett said, µWKHUH
ZLOODOZD\VEHWKRVH«HQFRXUDJLQJWKHLUIROORZHUVWRGHILQHWKHLUIDLWKDQGWKHLULGHQWLW\
LQRSSRVLWLRQWRRXWVLGHUVUDWKHUWKDQLQSRVLWLYHWHUPV«,WLVDZRUU\ing trend that young 
second generation British Muslims are more likely than their parents to feel they have to 
choose EHWZHHQIHHOLQJSDUWRIWKH8.DQGIHHOLQJSDUWRIWKHLUIDLWK«¶%OXQNHWW
3, Emphasis added). In a Fabian pamphlet written when Ruth Kelly was Secretary of 
State for Local Government and Communities and Liam Byrne was Minister of State for 
Immigration, they H[SUHVVHG VLPLODU FRQFHUQV DERXW 0XVOLPV¶ LGHQWLW\ µWKHUH LV D
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particular issue with a minority of second and third generatioQ0XVOLPV¶DELOLW\ WR IHHO
British (Byrne & Kelly, 2007, 25).  
Like the views of PDQ\ SROLWLFLDQV %OXQNHWW¶V ZHUH RIWHQ LQFRQVLVWHQW DQG
contradictory. He noted in the interview WKDWµSRVWth RI6HSWHPEHU¶,µthink there was a 
real problem in trying to hook the Islamic community and do something about them 
IHHOLQJ SDUW RI WKH FRXQWU\¶ He went on:  µZH QHHGHG [after 9/11/] to throw up a 
protective screen and we needed at the same time to hold out a hand to say, you know, 
\RXDUHSDUWRIXV«¶+HDGGHGµLW¶VDVHOIIXOILOOLQJSURSKHF\LI\RXVD\WRSHRSOH«ZH
WKLQN \RX DUH YHU\ GLIIHUHQW ZH WKLQN WKDW WKHUH LV D SUREOHP KHUH DQG«DQG ZH¶UH
extremely concerned that you do something about it, then that re-enforces a feeling. 
Whereas if you embrace people, wH¶YH DOO GRQH WKLV LQ RXU RZQ OLYHV LI \RX HPEUDFH
VRPHERG\ZKRLVJLYLQJ\RXDKDUGWLPHWKHQLWVPXFKPRUHGLIILFXOW¶2QHVWUDWHJ\for 
Blunkett was to embrace Muslims and help them µWR IHHO SDUW RI our FRPPXQLW\¶
(Interview with Blunkett, Emphasis added).  At the same time, however, as we have 
indicated, he emphasized that many Muslims lack a strong British identity, and in a 
newspaper interview in 2001, he noted how some Muslims should avoid marrying people 
from their countries of origin and needed to adhere to British norms (Blunkett, 2001). By 
%OXQNHWW¶V RZQ DGPLVVLRQ, his approach was not only inconsistent with his and his 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQGDWDVHWVDQGDSSURDFKWRXVLQJVXFKGDWDEXWDOVR with his own ideas 
of how to make Muslims feel at home in Britain at a time when they felt threatened by 
WKH µDWPRVSKHUH WKDW« had been created by the attack in America (Interview with 
Blunkett).      
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Similar contradictions are found among leading Conservative Party politicians. 
On the one hand, there are indications that they accept that Muslim values are now part of 
British society, as when William Hague , then Conservative Party leader,  in the week 
after the 2001 disturbances  in Oldham, pointed to   µWKHZD\LQZKLFK0XVOLPYDOXHVDUH
being built into the edifLFH RI 0RGHUQ %ULWDLQ¶ (Hague, 2001, p.6)  Sayeeda Warsi as 
opposition spokeswoman on community cohesion, and  after a trip to Sudan to aid the 
release of a British school teacher, made clear that being a Muslim does not conflict with 
British values:  µI hope our mission to Sudan demonstrated to people in Britain, and in 
RWKHU:HVWHUQFRXQWULHV WKDW\RXFDQEH0XVOLPDQGKROGILUPWR\RXUFRXQWU\¶VYDOXHV
and interests¶ (Warsi, undated, p2) Or listen to  former community cohesion spokesman 
Paul Goodman, who in our interview distinguished between older Muslim immigrants 
and the younger generations: µTKHYHU\ROGHVW WUDQFKHRI WKHSHRSOH    ,GRQ¶WJHW WKH
sense that when they arrived they ZDQWHGWRHQJDJHZLWKWKHPDLQVWUHDPFXOWXUH¶%XWLQ
successive genHUDWLRQVWKHUHDUHWKRVHµZKRSOXQJHWKHPVHOYHVLQWRWKHPDLQVWUHDP¶ 
Other leading Conservatives conceived of and portrayed Muslims rather differently.  
When we asked the then Shadow Security Minister, Pauline Neville Jones, who in 2007 
published a repoUW RQ FRPPXQLW\ FRKHVLRQ ZKHWKHU DQ\ SDUWLFXODU µW\SHV RI SHRSOH¶
might have difficulty feeling British, she DQVZHUHGµ7KDW¶VDYHU\JRRGTXHVWLRQDQGD
kind of important question, actually. WKDW,¶PDERXWWRVD\LVQRWEDVHGRQHLWKHUZRUN
ZH¶YHGRQHRURUVWXII,¶YHUHDG¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK3DXOLQH1HYLOOH-RQHV). She 
went on to say that there could be µTXLWH D ORW RI SHRSOH ZKR GRQ¶W IHHO SDUWLFXODUO\
%ULWLVK¶DQGWKXVthe focus should not be exclusively on Muslims. However, when asked 
whether some Muslims might have difficulty feeling British, Neville-Jones responded, 
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µ\HS¶LELGElsewhere she has been quoted as saying that  WKHFKDOOHQJHµLVQRWKRZ\RX
try to indigenise Islam . . . which is important, but how you give British Muslims in this 
country the feeling that actually they are Brits, like any other British (sic)¶ -RQHV and 
Fowler, 2007, p. 9). Former community cohesion spokesman and now Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve, shared such views. He seemed unaware of studies concerning British 
identity whilst saying, in our interview, that non-Muslims might have difficulty feeling 
British, and suggesting that Muslims might have trouble  both being and feeling British 
and hold views that are out of sync with British norms and traditions:  
If looked at bluntly, I keep on meeting very pleasant people, not just Muslims, 
sometimes from other religious groups but I have to say principally Muslims, 
who seem to me to have views, and I have listened carefully to what they've got 
to say, which are certainly incompatible with development in our national and 
KLVWRULFDOWUDGLWLRQ¶,QWHUYLHZZLWK'RPLQLF*ULHYH 
  
He went on: 
 
 It is true there are only a tiny number of people who want to blow themselves 
up on the underground killing people for the sake of their view of what the 
world should be like. But equally it seems to me that whilst there are large 
numbers of Muslims living in Britain who have very little difficulty reconciling 
their religious views with the advantages of living in a pluralist democratic 
society, there are actually quite a large number of them who, whilst they might 
be quite grateful for the fact that they are living in a pluralist society rather than 
being persecuted somewhere else, actually want to live in a society that is very 
GLIIHUHQW« (ibid). 
 
Thus, while he says that µlDUJHQXPEHUV¶RISHDFHIXO0XVOLPVDUHJODGWROLYHLQ%ULWDLQ
and benefit from doing so,  they allegedly wish Britain to be a very different society and 
this prevents them from identifying with it. Interestingly, Neville Jones offered a more 
critical view of British society that might explain why Muslims are loathe to identify with 
it. She referred to 'aspects of modern western British secular society[ «that] are 
particularly unattractive. The violence, the lawlessness, the drunkenness, the, um, the 
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vulgarity', these are all things that no 'sane person would actually want to join' (Interview 
with Pauline Neville Jones, 17/10/ 07).  
 
Being British 
 
Leading journalists also have made problematic links between Muslims and 
Britishness, but in a different way than the politicians we have discussed.  The newspaper 
coverage following IRUPHU +RPH DQG )RUHLJQ 6HFUHWDU\ -DFN 6WUDZ¶V FRQWURYHUVLDO
comments in 2006 about Muslim women who choose to wear the niqab (a full face veil) 
is a case in point. 6 In his weekly column in the Lancashire Telegraph (5 October, 2006) 
Straw explained the reasons why he asked Muslim women wearing the niqab to remove 
the veil when meeting him in his Blackburn constituency office. The removal of the face 
veil, he argued, enabled KLPWRHQJDJHPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\LQDµIDFH-to-IDFH¶ dialogue. He 
was better DEOHWRµVHHZKDWWKHRWKHUSHUVRQPHDQVDQGQRWMXVWKHDUZKDWWKH\VD\¶+H
GHVFULEHG IDFH YHLOV DV D µYLVLEOH VWDWHPHQW of separation anG GLIIHUHQFH¶ WKDW PDGH
µEHWWHUSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHWZRFRPPXQLWLHVPRUHGLIILFXOW¶7 He continued: 
 
It was not the first time I had conducted an interview with someone in a full 
veil, but this particular encounter, though very polite and respectful on both 
sides, got me thinking. In part, this was because of the apparent incongruity 
between the signals which indicate common bonds - the entirely English 
accent, the couple's education (wholly in the UK) - and the fact of the veil. 
                                                 
6 The discussion of newspaper coverage draws on a systematic content analysis of the national press 
UHDFWLRQ WR 6WUDZ¶V FRPPHQWV DOWKRXJK KHUH LW SXUSRVHIXOO\ OLPLWV WKH WLPH-frame to a ten day period in 
which the issue dominated the news agenda (5 to 15 October, 2006). By searching the LexisNexus database 
RIQDWLRQDOQHZVSDSHUDUFKLYHVZLWKWKHNH\ZRUGVµ6WUDZ¶DQGµ9HLO¶LGHQWLILHGLWHPVZHUHLGHQWLILHG
which, with the use of Atlas Ti, were coded in two stages ± first,  according to whether they comprised 
newspaper editorials or Leaders, news items or features, letters, and columnist opinion or comment and, 
VHFRQG DFFRUGLQJ WR D FRGLQJ VFKHGXOH GHYLVHG WR WDS NH\ ZRUGV VXFK DV µ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ µFRKHVLRQ¶
µPXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP¶ DQG VR RQ EHIRUH TXDOLWDWLYHO\ WUDFLQJ KRZ the newspaper items invoked or made 
reference to accounts of national identity and citizenship.  For a full methodological discussion see Meer, 
Dwyer and Modood (2010: 91-92). 
7 It is also worth noting that throughout the article and subsequent interviews, Straw continually 
distinguished between the full face veil or niqab, and other types of Muslim coverings such as the 
headscarf or hijab. 
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Above all, it ZDVEHFDXVH,IHOWXQFRPIRUWDEOHDERXWWDONLQJWRVRPHRQHµIDFH-
to-IDFH¶ZKR,FRXOGQRWVHHLELG 
Much later, and as the 2010 general election neared, 6WUDZDSRORJLVHGIRUWKHµSUREOHPV¶
that his views  caused Muslims, (Straw, 2012, p.480; Daily Mail, 27 April 2010), but in 
his memoirs he subtly changed positions again by noting how glad he was that he raised 
the issue (Straw, 2012, p.484). The notion that Muslims wearing the veil are antithetical 
to British traditions is implied LQ6WUDZ¶VFODLPVthat his views reflect in part µWKHFRQFHUQ
RIRWKHUZKLWHSHRSOH«¶6WUDZS  
6WUDZ¶VFRPPHQWVVHHPHGKDYHHQFRXUDJHGDQGJLYHQOHJLWLPDF\WRMRXUQDOLVWVWR
portray some Muslims as unable to be British  (Meer, Dwyer and Modood 2010). 
Characteristic of much of the newspaper coverage, and from all impressions, the national 
popular reaction saw the issue of the niqab   --- which was universally agreed to be worn 
by only a tiny percentage of Muslim women --- presented as a matter of national identity 
and minority-majority relations rather than a rather marginal issue of personal religious 
choice.  Consider the most widely read middle-market national newspaper, the Daily 
Mail, a publication widely recognised for focusing its coverage on controversial matters 
of ethnic minority difference. The Daily Mail¶V  editorials frequently framed their 
discussion by juxtaposing British national identity with Muslim separatism (facilitated by 
multiculturalism). The following extract provides a good illustration of how Muslims and 
national identity were often cast as mutually exclusive in that newspaper: 
[T]his Government has actively promoted multiculturalism, encouraged Muslim 
'ghettoes' and set its face against greater integration. Anyone who dared to 
question this new apartheid was routinely denounced as a 'racist'. Britishness? 
Who cares? For New Labour yes, including Mr Straw, it became an article of 
faith for the ethnic minorities to celebrate their own languages, culture and 
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traditions, at the expense of shared values. There could hardly be a more 
HIIHFWLYH UHFLSH IRUGLYLVLRQ ,V LW UHDOO\ VXUSULVLQJ«LI WKH\ >0XVOLPV@ VHH0U
Straw's views on the veil as a juddering reversal of all that has gone before? 
(Daily Mail, 7 October, 2006) 
 
Several important ideas intermingle in this passage, but clearly Britishness is portrayed as 
the opposite to a government- sponsored multiculturalism that encourages people to 
FHOHEUDWH WKHLU GLIIHUHQFHV 7KH ODWWHU KDV DOOHJHGO\ FUHDWHG D W\SH RI µDSDUWKHLG¶
especially among Muslims who were permitted, if not encouraged, to celebrate their 
distinctive features under multiculturalism. Seen as a corollary of multiculturalism, 
Muslim difference is juxtaposed with, and seen as antithetical to, Britishness which 
stands for shared values and integration. Like multiculturalism then, Muslim difference is 
conceived as a competitor to Britishness, with  the latter also seen to be missing among 
Muslims  --- although a sense of Britishness is viewed as having the ability to  rectify the 
problems that multiculturalism has allegedly fostered, LQFOXGLQJµ0XVOLPJKHWWRHV.¶ 
 
Prominent columnists in the Daily Mail expressed similar views. For example, 
Alison Pearson articulated how she and other women feel a sense of ownership of Britain 
that is disturbed by women wearing the niqab:  
 
It's not a nice sensation - to feel judged for wearing your own clothes in your 
own country. The truth is that females who cover their faces and bodies make 
XV XQHDV\ 7KH YHLO LV RIWHQ GRZQULJKW LQWLPLGDWLQJ >«@ , MXVt don't like 
seeing them on British streets. Nor do I want to see another newspaper 
provide, as it did this week, a cut-out-and-keep fashion guide to the different 
types of veil: 'Here we see Mumtaz, or rather we don't see Mumtaz because 
the poor kid is wearing a nosebag over her face, modelling the latest female-
inhibiting shrouds from the House of Taliban' (Pearson, 2006) 
 
More is at work here than national identity. There are clear intersections with gender and 
the discourse on female submission which undergirds the contested nature of what veiling 
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signifies (Dwyer, 2008). FRU3HDUVRQ WKH µFRXQWU\¶EHORQJV WRZRPHQZKRDUHZLOOLQJ
not to cover their faces and who have a ³OLEHUDO´conception of modest dress. Those who 
wear veils are in some sense aliens, even if they are also British  citizens. Their standards 
of prescribed modesty are not simply regarded as extreme but as un-British, making other 
women uneasy and self-FRQVFLRXVLQµWKHLURZQFRXQWU\¶7KHµ%ULWLVKVWUHHWV,¶as Pearson 
puts it, are no placHIRUWKRVHZHDULQJDJDUPHQWIURPWKHµ+RXVHRI7DOLEDQ¶ 
Perhaps surprisingly, some journalists at the Daily Telegraph, a conservative-
leaning newspaper, adopted a far more nuanced position with regards to the niqab.  
Charles Moore (2006), columnist in and former editor of the newspaper, did not endorse 
the idea of the veil as a symbol of oppression. Indeed, he noted how discussions about it 
among Muslims in Britain can at times signify autonomy. 0RRUH QRW RQO\ QRWHG µD
struggle for control of Islam in thLV FRXQWU\ DQG IRU LWV SROLWLFDO H[SORLWDWLRQ¶ but that 
wearing the niqab can simply be a form of rebellion among teenage girls against 
oppression they experience from their parents: : 
7KHUH LV DQ DWWHPSW WR µDUDELVH¶ 0XVOLPV IURP WKH ,QGLDQ VXE-continent, 
persuading them to wear clothes that are alien to their culture to show their 
UHOLJLRXV ]HDO« For a few Muslim girls in this country, wearing the veil is a 
form of oppression imposed by their families; for more, it is a form of teenage 
rebellion, of showing more commitment than their parents - a religious version 
of wearing a hoodie (7th October 2006, emphasis added.)    
 
Moore wrote that µPDQ\ QRQ-0XVOLPV ILQG WKHVH YHLOV D OLWWOH XQVHWWOLQJ«QRW EHFDXVH
WKH\ DUH DQ H[RWLF LPSRUW WR WKHVH VKRUHV«EXW EHFDXVH WKH\ FRQFHDO WKH IDFH¶ LELG
Nonetheless Moore noted that setting up British national traditions and the wearing of 
µWKHYHLO¶DV opposed is µDKRVWLOHVWDWHPHQWDERXWWKHVRFLHW\LQZKLFKWKHZHDUHUOLYHV¶
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(ibid), and wrongly portrays  Muslims who wear the niqab as being hostile to Britain and 
unwilling to behave like other British people.   
 
%XW ZKDW DERXW PRUH µGLIIHUHQFH IULHQGO\¶ QHZVSDSHUV OLNH WKH Independent? The 
Independent has a reputation for balanced discussion, and is less likely to cast  British 
national identity and e[DPSOHVRI0XVOLPµGLIIHUHQFH¶DVPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYH.  Indeed, one 
editorial, HQWLWOHGµ0U6WUDZKDVUDLVHGDYDOLGLVVXHEXWUHDFKHGWKHZURQJFRQFOXVLRQ,¶ 
PDLQWDLQHG WKDW µLW >WKHniqab] is not the wearing of the headscarI«8QOLNH LQ)UDQFH
where the wearing of headscarves at school became a highly contentious political issue, 
the attitude to headscarves in Britain has been wisely liberal, which has kept the subject 
ODUJHO\RXWRIWKHSROLWLFDOGRPDLQ¶2FWREHU   Another editorial went as far as to 
contrast what it characterized as negative contemporary press coverage of Muslims with 
that experienced by other groups in earlier periods: 
 
The shameful aspect is that we are repeating our mistakes, in standing by 
while certain ethnic or religious minorities - in this case, Muslims - are 
demonised. Britain may be seen abroad as having managed the transition to a 
multicultural society more successfully than some, but as a nation we have not 
overcome the tendency to susSHFW HYHQ IHDU µWKH RWKHU¶ Independent, 6 
October, 2006). 
 
Still, the Independent¶V editorials and main stories are particularly striking when 
contrasted with the ways its leading columnists use national identity to condemn those 
who wear the niqab and sometimes also the hijab (headscarf)  (see Ingram 2006,; Lewis 
2006;-, Orr 2006; Smith 2006)-.  This includes, most notably, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown 
(2006), one of only two or three Muslim columnists in the national press, who has 
portrayed wearers of the niqab as not only deliberately rejecting British, or at the least, 
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Western society, but also acting and dressing as aliens and abusing their freedoms by 
trying to make Britain more like Saudia Arabia:  
 
[W]hen does this country decide that it does not want citizens using their 
IUHHGRPV WREXLOG D VDWHOOLWH6DXGL$UDELDKHUH" >«@ ,W >niqab] rejects human 
FRPPRQDOLWLHV DQG HYHQ WKH PHPEHUVKLS RI VRFLHW\ LWVHOI« ,W LV KDUG WR EH D
Muslim today. And it becomes harder still when some choose deliberately to act 
and dress as aliens (9 October, 2006). 
 
The view that being Muslim and British can, at times, conflict is also nicely illustrated by 
The Sunday Telegraph columnist Patience Wheatcroft (2006) who characterised the 
niqab as  
 
[A] barrier that limits the creation of relationships. It unites those who nestle 
EHKLQGVXFKJDUPHQWVDQGPDNHVLWKDUGHUIRUWKHPWRLQWHJUDWH«,WPD\EHWKDW
there are many Muslims who choose to wear the veil but also want to play a full 
role in British society. They should realise that they are making that more 
difficult because of the uniform they choose to wear (8 October, 2006). 
In sum, journalists working on newspapers papers that are traditionally thought to span 
the political spectrum are portraying some Muslims as having difficulty being British.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have shown that some politicians are expounding the view that 
Muslims do not feel British, even though since the 1990s the relevant surveys suggest 
just the opposite; clearly a number of leading politicians conceive of and are promoting 
an inaccurate view about British Muslims. Also significant are the rationales for the 
politicians¶ VWDWHG YLHZV %OXQNHWW¶V UHDVRQV ZHUH HFRQRPLF DQG ZKLOe we certainly do 
not want to deny that poverty may cultivate a sense of exclusion, poverty is also 
experienced by certain white communities, but they are not typically thought to have 
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difficulty feeling British.  For several other leading politicians we quoted, some Muslims 
have difficulty feeling British because they want Britain to be a more Islamic land and 
they have difficulty leaving their own communities. These are empirical claims that have 
yet to be investigated, but given the high percentage of Muslims who feel British, these 
claims, even if true, can only apply to a very small percentage of Muslims. 
An understanding of what it means to be British is also being projected by senior 
journalists and it does not include all Muslims.  There has been a considerable focus on 
the tiny number of Muslims wearing the niqab, with the µJack Straw incident¶DFWing as a 
lightening rod for hostility against Muslims. The incident was seized upon as an 
opportunity to not just lambast conservative Islam, especially in its gender relations 
aspect, but multiculturalism as well. A marginal issue of dress obsessed the nation and its 
media for over a week in 2006. There was a massive outpouring of emotional repulsion 
against the niqab as un-British in a manner that threatened the acceptance of other non-
niqab wearing Muslims but who were visibly devout in various ways.  
This flood of negative feeling about the niqab in particular and Islam more 
generally, bursting through usual restraints about public discourse, illustrates an 
important feature of nationhood. For such exclusionary, affective power, no less than 
imaginative inclusivity is a central feature of national belonging.  Indeed, we noted 
earlier that the CMEB outlined how such exclusive understandings of the nation can be 
inaccurate, reflecting a selective reading of British history and a privileging of the 
majority that is difficult to justify.  More inclusive understandings of what it means to be 
British, that do not interpret Muslim difference as a barrier, are available and indeed two 
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of the authors of this paper have separately suggested the need to accept them (Modood, 
1992; Uberoi, 2007). Doing so would entail a willingness amongst journalists to accept a 
more inclusive form of Britishness, which would provide a µVSDFH IRU 0XVOLPV¶ LQ WKH
nation (Meer, Dyer and Modood, 2010). Certainly when the CMEB (2000) suggested 
UHFDVWLQJWKHQDWLRQDOVWRU\WKHPHGLD¶VUHDFWLRQZDVKRVWLOH%XWGHVSLWHTXHVWLRQVDERXW
both 0XVOLPV¶attachment to, and  ability to be a part of Britain, it is notable that the vast 
majority  still feel British. While we are right to be alert to the dangers of self-fulfilling 
prophecies, what is clear is that even if others can not envisage a conception of the nation 
that includes Muslims, many Muslims can. 
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